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BRII:F o-o- .'I_PPELLA~lT 
·~~ella~ts, s~~~e 2f ~tah and Beverly Larsen, appeal 
fro~: ar. :r-er of the lm•er court \·;hich dis:nissed a request 
for jud=~e~t on an order to sho~ cause that denied appel-
lant, St::~e of Uta":, all right to rernbursement for support 
pa}~ents 31ven res9ondent's children since the entry of a 
$1.00 su~9ort order. 
The lower court held that the $1.00 per year child 
su~pcct nrder w~s in fact a valid "order of support" and 
that the stat~ was not entitlE~ to the reasonable amount of 
sup2ort for mon~~ tendered by the state for care of the re-
sponJcnt's chil~rcP wh~ther or not the respondent's 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
circumstances had changed, and that that had to be done 
prospectively only. The court gave leave for the state to 
refile the order to show cause to correct flaws which would 
allow a modification for a new support order but outrightly 
dismissed the state's attempt to collect anything since the 
divorce order to that point of time. 
RELIEF SOUGHT Oi1 APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
order that a one dollar ($1.00) per year support order is 
an order of support and seek this court to declare the 
s~e void from its inception. Further, the appellants seek 
this cour~ to direct tte lower court to hold a hearing to 
es~ablisi what the respo~cent's liability for support has 
been si~ce the entry of t~e order of $1.00, with directions 
to grant judgment for the amount so declared up to and in-
cluding the $50 per month per child as requested in the 
state's order to show cause. 
STI>.TEMENT OF FACTS 
The co-plaintiff, Beverly Larsen, was awarded a 
decree of divorce from defendant in May of 1967. (F. 2t.-25) 
Care, custody and control of the parties' three minor child-
ren was awarded to the co-plaintiff, subject to reasonable 
rights of visitation by the defenJont. Decause of an ill-
ness and physical disability fror'"l which defc<'c1art t:,cn 
suffered, and by reason of emotional problems suff~~cd by 
-2-
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the children as a result of defendant's prior conduct, 
the visitation riqhts of defendant were limited. In addi-
tion, Jefendant was ordered to pay one dollar ($1.00) 
per year alimony and one dollar ($1.00) per year child sup-
~ort for the three children. The support orders were, 
however, subject to review and modification by the court, 
as t~e circumstances of the de:er.iant became such that he 
shc,.:l(: be recuircd to EJay additior.al amounts for support. 
Because of defendant's failure to provide support, 
de~~~iant's ~ife and children vere forced to rely upon pub-
lic csis~:~ce from April, 1972, through January, 1976. 
£-!---
~ of collect~o:-:: ·.:as executed on September 17, 
.-.: to utah coC:e _~_-_:c.:::J-::2ted 78-45-9, by which 
~:~~ts to s~~=c=c :'or herself and her children 
l<e=: = ___ . :,c,.=d t:::J those o:' c::-.e De:nrtme:1t of Social Serv-
ice". 
A hearing was helJ 0:1 plaintiffs' order to show 
caJse c:. '::.:::-il 16, 1976, to dete:::::1ine why the child sup-
port provision of the divorce decree should not be modified 
u~·~~rds 2~J ~;i1y a JU'ls~e~~ for th2 reason3blc a8ount of 
su:,,,vrt 'rem ,,,_,ri~, 1972, tLro·.:=1~1 February, 1976, based on 
t:,c r'lL' of fifty cblL•rs ~~~50.00) per !".or.::~ per child, 
sho.llJ r,ot !Jc ontl'rc•cl aga.icst .--:af(·:--dant for accrued and 
ur:paic1 chil,; suppurt plj~•er.ts tctaling six thousand seven 
-]-
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The state made an atteopt to bring to the court's 
attention the fact of changed circumstances since the entry 
of the order, as well as the contention that the $1.00 order 
is in fact no order of support. The lower court, as per 
Judge Croft, would not allow such evidence in, holding 
that since the order referred to was in fact an order of 
support, the state was not entitled to a retroactive deter-
rnination of liability and, therefore, the only matter the 
court could consider was present changed circumstances for 
prospective support only. The court held the order to show 
cause de=icient for the prospective hearing but gave leave 
to =~~~se: ~~r the state to refile for that matter only. 
Frc- =~is ':=ision, the state appeals. 
-=-::::: DIVORCE DECREE: SUPPORT ORDER DOES NOT 
c;:;STITUTE A:'l O:::WER OF SUPPORT AtlD \'lAS l\.IJ 
A3USE OF THE LO\'iER COU:KT 'S DISCRETION. 
1he sum of one dollar ($1.00) per year for the 
support of three {3) children, which the district court 
ordered in the divorce decree and which the lower court, 
through Judge Bryant H. Croft, affirmed, froo which this 
appeal is brought, was void from its inception. A child 
support order requires that an existing need be net. In 
the present case, no need was met at the time of t~e decree 
and no need has been met. In essence, the lower court has 
put its sta.mp of approval on "non-support" instc,arl o[ sup-
port. 
-4-
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As stated in the early case of Gould v. City of 
Lawrence, 160 l'!ass. 232, 35 N.E. 462 (1893), "the word 
'support' is often used in our statutes, and in its ordi-
nary signification it includes not merely board, but every-
thing necessary to proper maintenance." And, in Snyder v. 
Lane, 135 lv. Va. 887, 65 S.C.2d 483 (1951): "the >vords 
'rnai~tenance' and 'support' are usually synoymous. They 
mean necessaries of life and means of livelihood and include, 
but 01re not li:nited to, food, shelter and clothing." Since 
one iollar per year for t~ree children equals but 2.77 cents 
p~r chilJ per ~onth, this pittance not only fails to pro-
vi~- fer :~2 ~aintenance of the children, but also renders 
~:-:::: :::-e dut:; :::: pro·:ide support rec;uires a mean-
In~ ~=~::ri~~::ion on tn2 ~~rt of an obligor father is 
illust~Jccd b·,· v:1rious cc~e pro~isions. Utah Code Annotated 
"Enc>ry ~an shall support his \vife 
and his ::r.i:c:." -~-"support ccbt," as defined in Section 
73-~SL-= I~), "ccear1s the debt created by nonpayment of child 
sup;ort cnJ::r t~c la~s of this state or the decree of any 
court c._\c o.:r/rC•{ r-i-tt.•_· juriscli.:~ion ordering a SU:':"I to be 
pc.icl :~s c:-.ilcl. suiJr:_Jrt. '' J\n ir.dic:1tion a: ' . .Jha.t night be re-
CJ'~lirL:(_: L__~~· \.'uy of S\_l~.J~ ort is folli~.u in Scctior1s 78-45a-l and 
cn,!,•r ~'rctio>c 78-C: Sa-l, a father is liable 
fen· the c Juc,, tion, necc:-;sary S'-Ip;lOrt and funeral 
cxp'~'n:-,1": of /T~1~..,7 child. 1\ i\nd, under St:ction 7S-45b-2 (5), 
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"'Need' means the necessary costs of food, clothing, shelter 
and medical attendance for the support of any dependent 
child." Obviously, a valid support order must reflect and 
contribute to meeting these needs of the child. 
Not only were the needs of the children in the 
instant case not met, but the court belmv clearly abused 
its discretion by refusing to follow the guidelines set 
forth in Section 78-45-7: 
"Determination of amount of support.--
\'Then determining amount due for support the 
court shall consider all relevant factors 
including but not limited to: 
(1) the standard of living a~~ situa-
tion of the parties; 
(2) the relative wealth and i~come of the 
parties; 
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(4) the aGility of the obliq2e to earn; 
(5) the need of the obligee; 
(6) the ase of the parties; 
(7) the responsibility of the obligor 
for the support of others." 
Though the lower court in the divorce decree ~ade mention 
of defendant's illness and physical disabili~y. it clearly 
failed to seriously consider, much less talk -~bout, the other 
relevant factors as contained in 78-45-7, e.~ .• the standard 
of living and situation of the parties; the ~elative wealth 
and income of said parties; the needs and ac;,'s o: the obli-
gee children, etc. Indeed, the ridiculous"'·.::-- of $1.00 
should prima facie demonstrate that it did Years ugo, 
this court set forth the basic policy to LP f2llowcd in the 
Utah courts. This basic policy is found in -,~,s v. 
Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2cl 788 (l9'i~ , \·,herein thee 
rule of law decided upon was approved bPC~Hl _,,, it q 1V0' " • • 
-6-
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priJ-;1ary consideration to the riqhts and needs of children." 
(r::nphasis added.) 
Arpellants are hard put to distinguish which as-
pect of the former order took primary concern for "the 
children." The order, in esser.ce, made the children 
paupers, having to rely on the support of the state through 
public •.-.'elfare inste-:1d of the father who could have paid 
The affidavit of the State of Utah for the or-
der to show cause hearing shows that the defendant didn't 
e\·._::-_ ~;:::y ~::e ~~one c:.ollar" per year . 
C~-
. ~ c!isregard tr:e v.'el:are of the children as evi-
:~~ order is a~ a~~se of discretion of the lower 
'~-~c's att~~?= =o collect back the reasonable 
_ ~~r~ for t~2 s~~~ral years involved goes to 
:_s ~~co~sls=~~= ;osition the court originally 
here, the ~elfare of the children is 
tot::;ll~· oisre;3rdec1., as are t£"2 statutory duties imposed. 
r:c!Git2· s~·~=:s !:o:::- v::;ryina a::-.ounts of support when circum-
sta:-Jccs ' . .'a:cr?.nt, but an order of $1.00 a year for three child-
ren is ·:o r--;-,::J;." rc c;uP!'>rJ?.T, ~::1d :1ny judge rendering such a 
dccis1~- ~r s~:-JctiGning such an agreenent has abused the 
Such an 
orJ~r u·· 2.77 cents ocr child per Month is indeed not equit-
etLlc. This crJurt, u; l!tah Fu·.::l Corl::Janv v. Industrial Commis-
sic'_l',_, :::3 Utdl' lGu, 27 P.2,1 .13.;, h<elc1 thJt a child cannot 
\:iul ri•rl1t (1nc=s thC' court have of taking 
thdt rl...·,]1t ,t':.~~\' :(-, •. "1 r_hn chi_ l,l 1:•hcr_ t_l~c chi_Jd cannot even 
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do it himself? Appellants cannot find any reason for such 
logic. 
POINT II 
THE DUTY TO SUPPORT IS CONTINUING AND 
EXISTS REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE OF A 
COURT TO PROVIDE THEREFOR. 
Because of appellant's intense belief that the 
one dollar support order is NO ORDER OF SUPPORT, the ques-
tion then arises as to appellant's right to collect for 
the ~easonable support that should have been paid. The 
lo~e~ co~rt, as per Judge Croft, denied the appellant's 
ri:;::.': to '-'-'-'e that determined or even to have brought to 
t~e ::ar:·c ?.ttention t~e de~endant's ability to pay more 
th2..:-:. :...':e _ .·:-eed order frc:c a change of circumstances, such 
as ::eco~~~~ e~ployed. 
T~erefore, it is appellant's contention, backed 
by the co~rts of many states, that the duty to support 
exists and is continuing even when no support order (as in 
this case) is entered. Though this question is one of first 
impression in this state, Justice Ellet in his comments in 
the l•lhi taker v. \:hi taker No. 14 3 2 9, Filed June 10, 197 6, 
emphasized what appellants feel is their position: 
"Of course the defendant, as father of the 
children, would be liable in a civil action 
regardless of the lack of an order in the 
decree of d1vorce. In fact he Qight be cri~i­
nally l1able for failing to provide for his 
minor children if he was willful in that re-
gard." (Emphasis added.) 
This sheds some light on the fact that if the one dollar 
order is not considered a "support order" l i-1L>ility :;till 
-3-
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exists to third parties. Simply because a decree uses the 
terms "child support" or "support order" doesn't hide the 
fact that the order isn't what it purports to be. 
This "meaningful contribution" to a child's care 
is a continuing duty through a child's minority and as 
indicated by Utah Code Annotated 78-45-2 and 3, this duty 
continues until age 21, unless a court orders otherwise. 
Utah case law reinforces the absolute and continu-
ing nature of this duty. In Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 
23S•, 153 ?.2d 262 (1944), the court stated that the father 
has a positive cuty to su;:>port his minor child. And, in 
""his co·-.:::':: h:;.s ir.variably emphasized 
t~e :ather's c~ligation to support his child-
-r:.- -.::a.sed upo:--_ ::~~.e e~-2-:-:er~tary principle 
'::.".2-c. '::.!le L:c·.v '-"-:-;;cs-=.:; ·.:po:1 those who bring 
~~i:~re~ into =~e ~orl~ the duty to care for 
.:.:.r..c:. s-..:.~?ort tl-.2..~ ::lG:-i~g their rrinority and 
de;?e:l.ae:-tcy." 
The ColoraJo co~rt, in Garvi:1 v Garvin, 108 Colo. 415, 118 
P.2c 763 (19Sl), de~larec that the "primary liability of a 
father to support his minor child always exists during 
Plino::::-ity." 
This court has recognized that to take away 
fro~ a defcn~ant the duty and obligations of support cannot 
L:.: done C~nd to do so is void, unless perJ1litted by the law. 
In f~1ct, the court inJicutcd thut the duty is so funda-
ue:•;t::>J lh'lt "th0rc is not vcstc•; in uny court of this state 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
878 (1958). Though it will undoubtedly be argued that the 
order in this case did not go to the extreme as Riding, Id., 
and that a modification could have been made upon motion 
to the court, the fact that Mrs. Larsen has been on public 
assistance should not allow the respondent to hide be-
hind a purported "order of support" which is void as soon 
as abilities permit contribution of any degree at all. 
That point was at the original hearing date despite of his 
physical disabilities. There is nothing to indicate in the 
findings of fact (R-27) whether the respondent had any other 
income at all. nonetheless, he has willfully failed to make 
any atte!":Cpt to support his children despite the circumstances 
behi~d t~e tech~icality of the $1.00 support order. 
Because of the =c~~i~uing nature of this obliga-
tion, the great weight of authority holds the father lia-
ble even where the court has failed to provide for support. 
In Curton v. Gordon, 510 S.\·1.2d 682 (Texas, 1974), that 
court stated: 
"The natural father has the legal 
duty to support his child, even when not 
ordered by the trial court to make payments." 
And, in I<".rog v. Krog, 32 C.2d 812, 198 P.2d 510 (1948) 
"The law is established that, despite 
the fact that a final decree of divorce 
contains no provision for support of the 
children of the parties, the court ~ay in 
supplemental proceedings in the divorce ac-
tion order the husband to make payments for 
that purpose. (Citations omitted.) r·!ore-
over, a child's rights in this respect can-
not be barred by agreement between the 
parents." 
-10-
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Further, in Martinez v. State, 307 S.W.2d 259 (Texas 
Criminal, 1975), the court said, in the case of criminal 
non-support, that: 
even though the divorce decree 
makes no provision for support and mainte-
nance of the children, the father's duty 
is still primary and continuing." 
In Ree s '-'. Arc hi bald, supra, the Utah Supreme 
CoLrt succinctly stated the Utah position: . the great 
~eight of authority is that a father's obligation to support 
his ~i~or children is not changed by a divorce decree which 
gives =he custody of the children to the wife, but does 
no-: ~~:-:.t_:'__cn t::ei::.- support." (2:-:-.;:r.asis added.) 
:·2:-e, o: course, s:.:?:cort ·.-;as mentioned, but did 
::~:co ::·_:r': r2all·· inter:.:: 2. r: ce::ts a !:lonth to be support? 
.:...s pl2ci.:-:; tb.e stl'":'.? of appro\.ral on non-
te..-i-Jor.·::::· illness. Children !:lust live, too, and it is 
agai~st ~ublic colicy to encourage fathers this way out. 
POINT III 
IF l'U S COL!!\T l!OLDS Tl'.'~.T "'HE LO\·JER COURT 
"'Yi 'P,;·:c :,•; 0!\DER OF SUPPO?T SUCH l\S 
''!'.:'..T n; 'ITI~ CASE: G:'l A TE!PO?.ARY DASIS, 
TI!E lUC: c ':CO DlLARGED SUPPORT BEGiciS AlJTO-
:i\'CIC\L'~/ UPO:J i\ CHJ\:·JGE IN CIRCUNSTAl:CES 
;;oT\'iiTi'S ~',lt!DicJG A COU~l' ORDER TO 7HE CON-
1Tv\R':'. 
Though there is support in Utah law that fathers 
nay b~ tcnpor~ril~· r0lieved of the support obligation "if the 
ti:rat-.s:_ rciuctiu:-: o' "ai.c1" to the: children instead of per-
_, l-
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If there is allowed unfettered discretion, every father 
who is out of work, sick, lazy, etc., would have "good 
grounds to have the support reduced as in this case. 
Although it could be argued th~t the one dollar ($1.00) 
support order was only meant to show that the court below 
was aware of the defendant's support obligation and merely 
intended to demonstrate that said was relieved of his sup-
port duty, this court should restrict the interpretation 
on tte language as given by Judge Croft. 
~~~ge Croft held that even though there might 
hav~ tee~ s~bstantial and naterial change of circu~stances 
si~=~ t~~ ~~:er of $l.CJ of support was entered, the father-
no increa:oe<:. ::'.:t:;: of support until the order 
was ::.:-.a:::;_ Further, the holding pro-
hibi~s t~a s~ate or any ot~er third party furnishing suppo:~ 
the right ~o collect a reasonable compensation for aid ren-
dered eve'- if the defendant-father had the ability to Fay. 
A hypothetical at this point would be helpful: 
Mr. X is incapacitated from an acci-
dent and has zero income with no apparent 
ability to work. An order is entered 
totally relieving the defendant from his 
support obligation. One year later, Mr. X 
finds emplo~ent and nets $20,000 for th~ 
year. The ex-wife does not le~rn of the 
employment until one and one-hulf yeurs 
later because she has not seen r1r. X. 'T'ho 
court holds that even though Mr. X has haJ the 
ability to pay subst:wtial support for one 
and one-half yea.rs, he nc::C?cls not lJ'.'Cause c;f 
the prior order. 
-12-
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Appellants feel that though the above hypothetical 
might exaggerate the situation, they should have the oppor-
tunity to bring to tr_e court's attention any change of cir-
cumstances and the date such transpired, because if the 
reason for the reduction is no longer in existence, the 
order of the court is based on a non-existent situation. 
7herefore, the lower court should be required to review the 
situatio:' to see if the c.bility to support came into exist-
ence so~e ti~e before the hearing appealed from. Appellants 
no~::he!~ss ~aintain that a one dollar ($1.00) order of sup-
pc~-: :::.s ~_::J su;:;?or':: order ar.d are, therefore, entitled to 
ha ~:-~ ~~-~2~ co~rt re~iew ~he entire period and enter a 
j-.:.. ~-:r :'ce re>aso~::.::::e a:-:-.o:-';--,t over that period of time. 
:c::.::::::srs that --:-':;_c. 2-<.c s!'.auld be evaulated are 
ir-:.~.-.~st__-:.:':s, r2-:-~:::rric.r_::e, ~·-2:-:sior.s, t .... ·orkmen's co:n;>ensation, 
?~ch o: these factors tend to show 
To say 
that or:::e ~ :l.OC order is entered that a father can hide 
Le'·iwo tl-·3t ":::loc.::" -.-.ithout divulging any changes to the 
ccJur:... ~':...- c~_- ~-_;Jiciul~y ,:.isgrz::...:c the l:t.~·:s o:: this state and 
th-:· ~·ry:_-,ll ~.._ 1 ·-.:.t~· I)~:-'~:-'':S :_:;ho~llcl h2.ve for their children. 
I"t.il:• t' ~s court hcs heL1, in Riding, st:l)ra, 
tL:tt '•'-' cc•uJ.-t_ o" t:cc stotc c:t:c n:::k•.' a final order reliev-
inq c],,_. L<th·r o: lcis obliqations to sup;::>ort except under 
t}-~{' · ;(- ti(JC st.:;~utc:, Rock~,.;ooc: v. Rock.\,·ooJ, 65 Utah 261, 
-] 3-
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236 P. 457 (1957), has given indication that this could 
temporarily do away with the obligation. This court said: 
"The duty of the father to support 
his children, if he is able to do so, is 
imposed in this state by positive statute." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Further, in Hulse v. llulse, lll U!:ah 193, 176 P.2d 875 (1947), 
the court reiterated: . the father has the legal duty 
to support his minor child if he is able to do so." Equity 
calls for a review of circumstances, but appellants point 
out that there is a "'ide gulf betHeen "support" and. "contri-
bution." Though a legitimate support order might be $100-150 
per 2onth, courts should not totally do away with the 
support c~lisa~ion, as in ~his case, unless the facts are 
so extrer".e as to ,,,arrant ':.hat action as the only alternative. 
Appellants ::'.on' t read the above cc.ses to say tb.at the oblic;a-
tion can be done away. T~ese cases in equity show that if a 
father cannot "support" a child or children, that if he can 
contribute something towards their support, then he should. 
For example, one might be able to contribute $20 per 
month--which cannot literally be considered "support"--
but cannot pay $100 per month, which is a sc~port order. 
Does that mean that if one cannot pay $100 or over $50 
that he should pay nothing? 1;0~ IF THI: Fl\TliCR Cc<J Ulcl-
TRIBUTE AllYTHING, HE SEOULD IlE "I;QUIRCD ·~·o DCJ SCJ. Ti1c <;;l.OO 
order, however, is an abuse of this equitable princi~l~. 
-14-
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Th~ rea~rn ~= that equity goes both ways. Though it 
might b~ equitable to relieve the father of the full sup-
port obligation, the court ~ust look at the welfare of the 
children and allow equity to look after their interests as 
Hell. 
The exceptions to t~e general duty of support 
are s:-.::"_--c:::r-iz<e>c: ir. '59 AL'<2d, Section 2, as follows: 
of 
2 ._! 2 f.: i I~ l:, 
";..:-t excez ... tio!"'_ to the ger.2ral rule 
t~~t ~ ~at~er is liable for the support 
c~ a child after a divorce exists in some 
:-c-}tes i:: c.:~ses ·,.·here the f3ther Has unable 
tc ~ay ~or t~e su?port of his child at the 
-.:... --:e i. t ~.-:as fur:1is~3::! 1 or the circlli"'"'.:'.stances 
•ere such that if th~ mother had applied in 
-~a~ce for a s~~-ccrt or-der the court would 
-"" :--.c::·.·e recr..::'..::-c:~-- -ci<e father to support his 
This ~~~~==i~n is usually recognized 
~=-~e ~ard:h~= c~~~s. ~here the father has 
::::h::slca::.~:- -.:~-~:::.e to \-:ork for a long period 
:.:_:-n --.;:_j ·-. c. o:: no :Jropertv. u (Empha-
-.; c.~:cec:.) 
~=~~~er, if the circunstances change from this 
~lie·: to ~or~. the ~hole basis for the order 
~:ses and t: " ~'ut'" of su:1port is automatically 
-:-:--:e >~··.:"r cct;rc should then make a determination 
535 (l'):c,), e:ctcrt'lincd this sane ques-
t i_ U'1 ,'. !"""'. l 'l · 
"h--" :.-c1th,~r o' ,, child 1-:ill not be relieved 
,,r· li::~·:li_t.\· to ~~u:':Jort it except \Vherc his 
i_r.~:_.~~li_· :.:_;do so clc:~lrly CtJ?~2ars." (Emphasis 
,t,iJec',.) 
-l -..,_ 
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Once again, the equitable principle is clear that 
if there is a time the circumstances for reduction have 
changed so that it is not "clear" that the reduction should 
continue, the "duty" once again arises and a court is given 
authority to retroactively review the situation from that 
point onv1ard. 
There are many times in divorces where personal 
jurisdiction over the father is not possible. The court 
must then ~ake an order something to the effect that the 
mattar of child support will be held in abeyance pending 
To take the logic of Judge 
Crc~~·s =~~~~ further is to sa~ that because there was no 
j~=-;~ic-_ ·· over the a~se~t fat~er, no legal or moral duty 
O'V'-.r---
_..~-- _ _. --- ~he ~ecree ~s =o~i~ied. This is a totally 
I~ a court gets jurisdiction over 
the abse~~ father at sone later date--which could be nonths 
or years--=hat court has the right to make the determinatioo 
as to the father's liability while absent. This is clear 
even though a divorce decree night be silent on the matter 
of support entirely. 
l·:hile it is generally belcl th.:>t rrocoified oc·ders 
are not given retroactive effect, equity, the welfare uf 
children, reimbursement to the state anJ other reasons all 
give support to the basic vie·.-1 that H' A FLT!ILR Ci\'1 c;UPPOR~ 
OR CONTRIBUTE TO TEE SUPPORT O"' !liS CIIJ:LDi'E'I, !iF :c:rrnr:UJ BE 
Lii\BLE THEP.EFOR. 
-H-
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That an obliqor father knows of his duty of 
support is clear; the obligor father also knows that relief 
therefrom can be effective only so long as he remains ill 
or disabled. The father is well aware of his own personal 
condition and of any subsequent change in circumstance 
which would reinstate his continuing duty. To relieve the 
father of all liability after he has recovered because of 
his willful failure to report his improved condition to 
the :::our~ or because of lack of diligence on the part of 
other ?arties involved ~ould open the door to abuse and en-
cour~~~ fraud 2nd irres~onsibility. A father could, for 
e:-:_:-J2_e:, ::e ci:::ai::>lC'cl for a short tL"T',e, go back to work, 
e~r~ , 3u~s:~~t12l salar~ and yet owe nothing merely be-
:-.:..s .:~-.J.:-:=~::2 circt..:.....-:-.s:.:.:--.-::e ~ .. ;.:..s ::'..Ot discovered or acted 
r prirarJ reason for not allowing retroactive 
application of a re?ised :::ourt order is the possibility of 
t!K, fa tl:er b2inq order eel to pay SU!11S 1-1hich would be unfair 
to ltl:c. Su:::~ a ?ituaticn, ho~ever, is before the court. The 
court lLt,; the co::-•:)~tcn~e to kno\,; the "needs" of children, the 
"ncecLc;" of the fatl'er, anJ has the ability to establish 
liability based on principles of fairness and justice. 
7hus, qivcn the continuing absolute nature of a 
fath::>-'s :c-urc:ort clut,y, the stronq possibility of fraud and 
abuse, c1ncl th-a :act t!c.:l~ the stiltc hZJ: little choice but 
-l7-
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to provide assistance and is frequently not in a position 
to protect itself from acts of irresponsible individuals, 
the lower court erred by not allowing the state to collect 
reimbursement for sums expended in behalf of defendant's 
children at least from the time of changed circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
No court of this state should have the right to 
reduce the support obligation to 2.7 cents per child per 
month. To do so mocks the very principles upon which our 
society is based--responsibility. 
This court should hold void the $1.00 support 
ord2r as being ho order at all and remand the case to the 
lower co'.lrt for a deterni;,ation o:: what liability the de-
fendant-respondent has sin~e t~e entry of the order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VEH.Nml B. HO~INEY 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCm·:nmi:·L'\~1 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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